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Truth-Claiming in Fiction
Towards a Poetics of Literary Assertion
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abstract  In the contemporary analytic philosophy of literature and es­
pecially literary theory, the paradigmatic way of understanding the beliefs 
and attitudes expressed in works of literary narrative fiction is to attribute 
them to an implied author, an entity which the literary critic Wayne C. Booth 
introduced in his influential study The Rhetoric of Fiction. The aim of this 
paper is to suggest that although the implied author sheds light on certain type 
of literary narratives, it is insufficient in a so­called conversational interpreta­
tion, which emphasizes the truth­claims conveyed by a fiction. In my paper, I 
shall show that, first, from an ontological point of view, truth­claims or actual 
assertions in fiction, if any, have to be attributed to the actual author and, sec­
ond, that the question of truth­claiming in and by fiction is an epistemological 
matter concerning the actual intentions of the author.
keywords  Literature, fiction, interpretation, implied author, actual author, 
truth­claiming
1. Introduction
“Literary criticism often invents authors: It will take two dissimilar works – the 
Tao Te Ching and the 1001 Nights, for instance – attribute them to a single author, 
and then in all good conscience determine the psychology of that most inter-
esting homme de lettres…” –Jorge Luis Borges, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”.1
In the contemporary analytic philosophy of literature and especially liter-
ary theory, the paradigmatic way of understanding the beliefs and atti-
tudes expressed in works of literary narrative fiction is to attribute them to 
an implied author, an entity which the literary critic Wayne C. Booth intro-
duced in his influential study The Rhetoric of Fiction. Roughly put, the im-
plied author is an entity between the actual author and the narrator whose 
beliefs and attitudes cannot be appropriately ascribed to the actual author. 
Over the decades, this the author’s second self, a construct the actual author 
is seen to create in her act of writing, has gained an established place in 
literary theory. In the philosophy of literature, in turn, the implied author 
has evolved into multiple entities; it has been represented and developed 
as, for instance, the postulated author (Alexander Nehamas), the fictional 
author (Gregory Currie) and the model author (Umberto Eco).
In general, the implied author is a workable concept in literary in-
terpretation. As the implied author is embedded in the work and can 
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be derived solely from it, her views help to understand certain types of 
narratives. Nonetheless, the implied author is an inadequate authorial 
concept when studying certain social functions of literature. Now, there 
are works and even sub-genres of fiction in which truth-claims about, 
say, moral, political, historical and philosophical issues have a focal role 
in understanding the work appropriately. Conveying genuine messages 
and changing readers’ beliefs through fiction are widely acknowledged 
and central functions of the literary practice. The problem is, however, 
that the implied author, as generally understood as a fictional entity, can-
not be the locus of genuine beliefs.2
The aim of this paper is to suggest that although the implied author, 
and its philosophical counterparts, sheds light on certain types of narra-
tives, it is insufficient in approaches which emphasize the truth-claims 
conveyed by a work. In what follows, I shall show that, first, from an 
ontological point of view, truth-claims or actual assertions in literary fic-
tion, if any, have to be attributed to the actual author and, second, that the 
question of truth-claiming in and by literary fiction is an epistemological 
matter concerning the actual intentions of the author.
2. The Voice behind the Lines
Wayne C. Booth’s Rhetoric of Fiction, originally published in 1961 and re-
vised in 1983, has had an enormous effect on literary criticism and the 
philosophy of literature, especially the Anglo-American analytic tradition. 
In his study, Booth proposed a middle course between the New Critics who 
denied the relevance of the actual author’s intentions in literary interpre-
tation and biographical critics who argued that a literary work should be 
understood in the light of the life of its author. Booth argued against the 
New Critics by claiming that one cannot talk about a text without talking 
about the author, for a text implies its author’s existence. However, Booth 
also wanted to distance himself from biographical criticism which he con-
sidered rather unscientific; as he saw it, the actual author’s intentions (that 
is, her beliefs and attitudes) and her values and feelings cannot ever be 
known. To navigate between these two interpretative practices, Booth in-
troduced the implied author, who “chooses, consciously or unconsciously, 
what we read; we infer him as an ideal, literary, created version of the real 
man; he is the sum of his own choices.”3
In general, it has been thought that what basically creates the implied 
author is the author’s literary-fictive mode of speaking. For Booth, for 
instance, the implied author primarily consists of the author’s style, tone 
and technique. Nevertheless, Booth maintains that the implied author 
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is not only a product which the author intentionally creates but also a 
construction made by the reader about the author based on the work.4 
According to him, it does not matter how impersonal the author may 
try to be, for her readers will inevitably construct the implied author. As 
Booth sees it, readers need to postulate the implied author, for their reac-
tions to the implied author’s “various commitments, secret or overt” help 
to determine their response to the work. For him, readers’ sense of the 
implied author includes the meanings extracted from the work and also 
the moral and emotional content of events portrayed in the work.5
Moreover, Booth argues that the implied author is work-bound and that 
the author’s different works will imply different versions of the implied 
author. As he sees it, the differences become evident when the implied 
author is given “an overt, speaking role in the story.”6 Elsewhere, Booth 
also speaks of a career author, a person construct which consists of implied 
authors of works published under the same author name. He defines the 
career author as “a cumulative character whom we infer as we read a sec-
ond or third tale told by what we call the ‘same’ teller” and “who is the sum 
of various inferred characters.” According to Booth, the career author is the 
character “implied by the writing of a sequence of works.” However, Booth 
also argues that the career author is distinct from the actual author. He 
claims that “no matter how many tales [the author] tells, an immense pro-
portion of what he believed, did, or said will never appear in his fictions.”7
In analytic philosophy of literature, Booth’s theory of the implied 
author has been developed especially by so-called hypothetical inten-
tionalists who consider the meaning of a literary work as an assumption 
of either the actual author’s or of an hypothetical or postulated author’s 
intended meaning by referring to the beliefs and expectations of the 
author’s intended, ideal or appropriate audience.8 To mention some, 
Alexander Nehamas suggests in his theory of the postulated author, 
which he also refers to as “the author figure,”9 that while a literary work 
is interpreted and understood as its author’s production, its author is not 
identical with the historical author. Instead, Nehamas argues, the author 
of a literary work is “postulated as the agent whose actions account for 
the text’s features; he is a character, a hypothesis which is accepted pro-
visionally, guides interpretation, and is in turn modified in its light.”10 
According to Nehamas, the author is not a person but a construction pro-
duced “jointly by writer and text, by work and critic”; she is “a plausible 
historical variant of the writer, a character the writer could have been, 
someone who means what the writer could have meant, but never, in 
any sense, did mean.”11 Akin to Nehamas, Jenefer M. Robinson suggests 
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that it is a convention of the literary practice that the author more or less 
consciously adopts a persona and that she is not trying to deceive her au-
dience into believing that this assumed persona is her own. As Robinson 
sees it, the author’s persona, her style, is an expression of the personality 
she seems to have: the author’s style consists of, for instance, her way of 
treating the subject and the theme of the work.12
A focal reason for the attractiveness of the implied author theory has 
had is, as P. D. Juhl puts it, that the implied author is completely incorpor-
ated in a work and hence can be grasped from it.13 Further, as a Boothian 
autonomous collection of beliefs and norms, the implied author makes 
it possible to distinguish between the narrator’s beliefs and the author’s 
beliefs which, in turn, prepares the way for, say, identifying an unreliable 
narrator. In spite of its merits, the implied author does not, nonetheless, 
stretch wide enough to explain literary communication acts.
3. An Ontological Approach to Truth-Claiming in Fiction
Literary fictions have other social functions in addition to their essential 
aesthetic function. Literary fictions, as other artworks, do not “merely” 
treat issues important in life; they also convey genuine messages about, 
say, philosophical issues. To mention some, it is generally believed that 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace includes Leo Tolstoy’s thoughts on the philos ophy 
of history; that Sartre’s works such as Nausea and No Exit are literary mani-
festations of Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist philosophy; that Murdoch’s 
The Black Prince is Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophic investigation. Here, 
intentionalist oriented cognitivists maintain that because literary art is hu-
man action, assertions put forward in literary fictions should be examined 
as actual authors’ assertions.
In turn, so-called anti-cognitivist theorists suggest that the points lit-
erary fictions seem to convey cannot be attributed to actual authors be-
cause of the artistic nature of the works. Anti-cognitivist views which 
accentuate the relevance of the implied author in literary interpretation 
generally connect to Austinian/Searlean and Gricean based theories of 
fiction. These theories suggest that the conventions of fictive story-telling 
invite the reader to respond to assertion-looking sentences in fiction as 
being uttered by a fictional speaker and be made-believe instead of as-
sessed as true or false. The theories also maintain that because of the 
author’s fictive mode of speaking, which postulates the implied author 
and the narrator, there is no bond between the author and the assertions 
in the work; rather, beliefs a fiction seems to express or imply are to be 
attributed to its implied author.14
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It is difficult to see how the author’s fictive mode of speaking could 
actually forestall her act of truth-claiming. Given that there are asser-
tions made in and by literary fictions, the assertions have to be attributed 
to actual authors, for only human agents may make genuine assertions. 
Naturally, one may also attribute beliefs and truth-claims expressed in 
a work of fiction to an implied author, but in such case the realm of the 
beliefs and truth-claims remains fictional: they belong to the same ficti-
tious world of the work as the implied author herself.
When talking about the truth-claims embedded in Tolstoy’s War 
and Peace in his Art and Philosophy published in 1980, Joseph Margolis 
makes a typical distinction between the author’s assertions and the fic-
tional speaker’s assertions. Margolis suggests that a characteristically 
fictional work, a novel, for instance, that seems to convey truth-claims 
may require the reader to make a distinction between the utterances of a 
fictional voice, generally the narrator of the work, and those of the actual 
author. Nevertheless, Margolis does not maintain such an austere distinc-
tion but suggests that maybe the reader should take the fictional voice 
to be what the author wants to predicate as true of the actual world.15 As 
Margolis suggests, a fiction can be said to make claims or reference only 
if the claims and references are construed as the actual author’s claims 
and references. Hence, while a fictional speaker cannot perform genuine 
acts, the author may generate genuine acts by her fictive utterances, for 
instance, by representing the fictional speaker’s assertions.
In turn, Noël Carroll suggests that literary interpretation is “roughly 
analogous” with the interpretation of everyday conversation: the rela-
tion between the actual reader and the actual author is similar to that of 
a hearer and a speaker, for both the reader and the hearer are trying to 
grasp their conversational partner’s intended meaning.16 Now, Carroll 
suggests that when looking for truth-claims made in a literary work, one 
should pay attention not only to “non-fictional” parts that seem to be 
uttered by the actual author but also to the ways the represented illo-
cutionary actions, such as characters’ assertions, are used by the author 
to generate genuine illocutionary actions. As Carroll sees it, one should 
examine what the role of a character is in the context of the work and 
what the author’s aim is in representing her actions.17 Conversely, Jerrold 
Levinson, a paradigmatic hypothetical intentionalist, objects to Carroll’s 
proposal by claiming that, first, passages in literary works which Carroll 
labels non-fictional must logically be attributed to an implied speaker or 
a (Beardsleyan-type) narrator because they are put forward by a fictional 
character, who, unlike the author, belongs to the fictional world of the 
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work and reports its events (which she believes in). Second, Levinson 
argues that one should not divide a literary work into two parts, the 
author’s assertions and the fictional story, for such a distinction would 
dismiss the “artistic integrity” of the work and make it something which 
is neither fiction nor non-fiction.18
Here, I would like to develop the conversational approach initiated by 
Carroll. As I see it, Levinson’s argument does not, nonetheless, threaten 
the conversational approach, for, first, the ontological difference between 
the actual author and the implied author is for the former in the act 
of truth-claiming. Although it is true, as Levinson suggests, that actual 
authors do not believe in fictional characters and events their works con-
tain, it is also true that fictional characters, such as implied authors, can-
not make actual assertions. Second, the conversational approach does 
not need to divide a literary work into a fictional story and passages 
genuinely asserted by the author. In the conversational approach, it 
may be suggested that conventions of the literary institution determine 
readers’ fictive stance towards the propositions expressed in works of 
(fictional) literature. Carroll, for instance, maintains that readers should 
attribute the assertions expressed in a literary fiction primarily to the 
fictional speaker in question; what he argues is that the assertions may 
be considered in the second place as the actual author’s assertions: the 
conversational approach aims at examining, for instance, what would 
be the role of the characters’ fictional assertions in the author’s overall 
assertion act.
4. Reaching the Author
The most testing problem in the conversational approach is that liter-
ary fictions may seem to express beliefs which cannot be ascribed to the 
actual author; rather, such fictional beliefs can only be appropriately at-
tributed to the implied author. After all, literature is a form of art, and the 
actual author does not have to hold the beliefs her fictional work seems 
to put forward. For instance, it is possible that philosophical points a 
literary fiction seems to suggest are “mere” constituents of the work’s 
theme. Sometimes it may also be difficult to distinguish the claims the 
reader has constructed from the work from those actually asserted by 
the author. The problem of truth-claiming in literary fiction is, thus, that 
only the actual author may make claims but a work may seem to convey 
claims which cannot be attributed to the actual author.19
As suggested in the beginning of the paper, a focal reason for the at-
tractiveness of the implied author theory is that it proposes an easy way 
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to norms that govern the narrative structure of the work. For instance, 
Gregory Currie, a hypothetical intentionalist, suggests in his theory of 
fiction that the implied author, or the fictional author, is a fictional char-
acter who is constructed in the act of make-believe and is taken to be 
telling the story as known fact. For Currie, reading is an exploration of 
the implied author’s belief structure, whereas the belief set of the implied 
author consists of the propositions she believes.20 Conversely, it has been 
argued that actual intentionalist approaches may never succeed, for in-
tentions, considered as beliefs and attitudes, are private mental events.
However, such an argument threatens only absolute intentionalist 
views which maintain that the meaning of a literary work is what the 
actual author intended it to mean (and which thus run into problems in 
cases where there is a difference between the conventional textual mean-
ing of the work and the author’s intended meaning). Admittedly, abso-
lute intentionalism is a mistaken view, because it takes literary works 
to mean just whatever their authors choose them to mean. Neverthe-
less, moderate actual intentionalism, an interpretative practice proposed 
in different forms in the 1990s by philosophers such as Carroll, Gary 
Iseminger, Robert Stecker and Paisley Livingston, maintains that the 
author’s intentions can be grasped through her work because they mani-
fest themselves in the work. Moderate actual intentionalism suggests 
that the utterance meaning of the work guides the reader to the author’s 
intended meaning. It maintains that while there is no direct access to the 
author’s intentions proper, her intentions are generally recoverable from 
her work, the context of the utterance and our information about her.21
Since the publication of Booth’s study, many have suggested that the 
talk about the implied author is often just a way to sidestep talk about the 
actual author. It has been noted that different sorts of fictional authors 
are often actually concealed actual authors as they are, for instance, de-
fined or referred to through the actual author. For example, Daniel O. 
Nathan suggests that William Tolhurst’s hypothetical intentionalism 
actually depends upon actual intentionalism, for it refers to the actual 
author’s intended audience.22 The same can be said of Levinson’s hypo-
thetical intentionalism, for it also refers to the actual author’s ideal or 
appropriate audience. In turn, Nehamas’s postulated author, or “histori-
cally plausible author,”23 is said to look very much like the actual author 
from whom he wants to distinguish his author construct. Now, as Robert 
Stecker puts it, the talk of the postulated author is in many occasions 
“directly translatable” into talk of hypotheses about the actual author.24 
Similarly, Saam Trivedi, a “moderate hypothetical intentionalist,” as he 
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classifies himself, suggests that if one is to look for the communication a 
literary work attends to, then one should look for the actual author and 
her communicative intentions.25
Here, it is important to note that there are, roughly, two brands of 
hypothetical intentionalism which can be called actual author hypotheti-
cal intentionalism and postulated author hypothetical intentionalism. The 
first difference between these theories is ontological. Actual author hypo-
thetical intentionalism argues that authors are not fictional but that their 
intended meanings are; Tolhurst, Levinson and Trivedi, to mention some, 
support this view. In turn, postulated author hypothetical intentionalism 
suggests that literary interpretation should not make assumptions about 
the actual author’s intended meaning but that it should rather postulate 
an author construct to whom the beliefs expressed in the work are at-
tributed; theorists such as Nehamas, Currie and Robinson argue for this 
view. Second, actual author hypothetical intentionalism and postulated 
author hypothetical intentionalism are also seen to differ epistemologi-
cally. Paisley Livingston and Sherri Irvin suggest that the actual author 
hypothetical intentionalism and the postulated author hypothetical 
intentionalism differ in that actual author hypothetical intentionalism 
may also make use of the author’s public biography in producing hy-
potheses (but not assessing other hypotheses true or false), whereas the 
postulated author hypothetical intentionalism constructs the author and 
her intentions from the work only.26
In turn, the difference between moderate actual intentionalism and 
moderate hypothetical intentionalism (or actual author hypothetical 
intentionalism) might look even vaguer, because both interpretative 
strategies make hypotheses and assumptions about the actual author’s 
intentions. One difference between the approaches is that moderate 
hypothetical intentionalism bases its hypotheses on the actual author’s 
ideal audience, emphasizing that the literary utterance meaning of the 
work is constrained by, say, prevailing literary conventions and the com-
mon beliefs of the period the work was composed, whereas moderate ac-
tual intentionalism also takes into account the author’s actual intentions. 
Further, moderate hypothetical intentionalism does not allow the author 
to assess an interpretation considered plausible by interpreters as true 
or false, whereas moderate actual intentionalism welcomes references 
to the author’s declarations of intention in its search for the meaning 
of the work. Hence, what makes moderate hypothetical intentionalism 
hypothetical is that it stagnates at hypotheses even in cases where there 
is information about the author’s actual aims and beliefs.
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Here, I would like to propose a few fresh arguments in support of 
moderate actual intentionalism, or rather two reasons why moderate ac-
tual intentionalism should be preferred to hypothetical intentionalism. 
As I see it, there are two major problems in hypothetical intentionalism 
when examining the conversational function of literature:27 first, what 
are interpreters to do with equally plausible hypotheses which hypothet-
ical intentionalist approaches produce, and second, how are interpreters 
to distinguish between the meaning of a work and its significance or 
uses?28 To begin with, hypothetical intentionalism maintains that where 
there is room for choice, say, when two hypotheses are equal in their 
epistemological plausibility, interpreters should choose the construal 
which makes the work “artistically better.”29 However, if the interpreter 
is to determine the truth-claims made in or by a work, she really should 
not take the work meaning to be the artistically most valuable hypoth-
esis. Instead, the interpreter should look for the actual author’s intended 
meaning. And if there are several interpretations of the literary utterance 
meaning which are equal in their epistemological plausibility, moderate 
intentionalism may solve the debate about the correct, or most plausible, 
interpretation by referring to the actual aims the author has expressed 
elsewhere.
Furthermore, as noted above, hypothetical intentionalism also allows 
anachronistic interpretations if they enhance the artistic value of the 
work. Nevertheless, when determining the truth-claims a literary fiction 
makes, interpreters should by no means allow an interpretation that the 
actual author could not have made. An interpretation of the philosophi-
cal meaning of Sartre’s Nausea is the meaning given by its historical 
author. On the other hand, an interpretation of Nausea that aims, for ex-
ample, at shedding light on a contemporary philosophical issue, ascribes 
significance to the work, not meaning. The latter, creative interpretation 
is not philosophically less important; it just does not aim at recovering 
the (intended) philosophical meaning of the work.30
5. The Implied Author as the Author’s Style
Even if one accepts the thesis that only the actual author may be the 
locus of genuine beliefs and attitudes, a question still remains: what is 
the need, role and function of the implied author in interpretation? In 
literary criticism, the concept of the implied author might prove usable, 
for it allows the talk of, say, the beliefs, attitudes and values the author of 
the work seems to have without reference to anything outside the work. 
In turn, when investigating philosophical fictions and other artworks 
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that have conversational aims, it might be reasonable to take the implied 
author rather as the actual author’s narrative device, that is, the way she 
expresses her beliefs.
My proposal concerning the role and function of the implied author in 
the conversational approach is based on the suggestion which the liter-
ary critic Uri Margolin makes in his essay “Cognitive Sciences and the 
Representation of the Mind in Literary Narrative” (2003). As Margolin 
sees it, the implied author could be explicated by the notion of the ac-
tual author’s “cognitive style,”31 which in cognitive science generally de-
scribes the way people think, perceive and remember information. One 
should, however, note that in his article Margolin is investigating literary 
narratives from the viewpoint of cognitive sciences, and his idea is ap-
plied here rather figuratively.
Booth’s late writings also support an understanding of the implied 
author as a means rather than the end of an interpretation. In his article 
“Resurrection of the Implied Author: Why Bother?” (2005), Booth sug-
gests that actual authors create implied authors like people create masks, 
favourable versions of themselves, in their everyday life. Furthermore, 
Booth implies that all writing, for example, the production of scientific 
works, creates implied authors.32 In his account, the implied author is 
simply a picture of the author as she wants her readers to see her. Ac-
tually, as Booth flattens the concept of the implied author by claiming 
that it relates to all sorts of writing, the concept becomes something very 
close to the concept of style from which it was developed.33
Let us consider, for instance, personae autobiographies are thought to 
project. In literary criticism it has been suggested that the genre conven-
tions of autobiography allow the author to prettify her past; that the 
readers will not take autobiographies as neutral and all-inclusive fact-
stating discourse. Following Booth’s suggestion, one could say that in 
writing an autobiography, the actual author creates an implied author 
which differs from the actual author in certain respects. Here, I suggest 
that one brings into mind friar Ockham’s lex parsimoniae: in the case 
of the author of an autobiography who prettifies her past, there is no 
need to say that the actual author creates a favourable author construct 
that narrates the events; more like, one should say that the actual author 
chooses facts, leaves out some issues or perhaps even lies. Another ex-
ample: philosophical studies may embody aggravations, back-pedalled 
statements and the like. A view a philosopher might characterize “non-
sensical” for her colleague becomes “difficult to grasp” when she writes a 
philosophical paper following the principle of charity, for instance. As I 
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see it, one does not need to postulate an implied author for a philosophi-
cal paper in interpretation. Instead, I think that one should speak about 
the actual author’s style governed both by discursive conventions regu-
lated by the institution and especially her personal views concerning 
communication of information and style of argumentation.
What about philosophical fiction, then? What is the role of the im-
plied author in interpreting truth-claims literary fictions such as Sartre’s 
Nausea and No Exit convey? I propose that the implied author may have 
a role in understanding the work; it can be used as a narrative strat-
egy, for instance, in illustrating a certain kind of way to see the world. 
Further, the actual author may, say, emphasize or exaggerate her philo-
sophical claims by using a certain type of implied author, that is, style.34 
Moreover, I find it difficult to grasp how, for example, the actual author’s 
insincerity, her aim to picture herself as more favourable (or unfavour-
able) than she actually is, would affect the general philosophical views 
she makes through her work. If one takes Sartre to give a favourable 
picture of himself in his literary works, does this affect, for instance, the 
philosophical content of illustrations of existential angst in the works? 
No, it does not. Thus, I argue that the implied author is best considered a 
narrative device related to the author’s literary assertion act.
As noted in the beginning of the paper, it has also been suggested that 
because the implied author is constructed from the work, every work 
embodies an individual implied author. There is nothing peculiar in that. 
Authors write different sorts of works which project different sorts of 
pictures of their makers. However, it is not reasonable to maintain that 
the author who makes genuine illocutionary acts in and by her work 
should be considered completely work-bound. Let us again consider 
an analogy in philosophy. Philosophical beliefs are admittedly in a cer-
tain sense work-bound: philosophers often change their minds and de-
velop and modify their views; Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations 
project different pictures of Wittgenstein. As I see it, instead of saying 
that these works postulate different authors, it would be more apt to 
say that the author’s beliefs expressed in these works, and styles used to 
express them, differ. And as in Wittgenstein’s case, when examining the 
philosophical views Sartre conveys by his literary works, an interpreter 
should not construct the author of these philosophical views ex nihilo, 
novel by novel and play by play, but consider them as the actual author’s 
prevailing views.
In a lecture given in 1966, entitled “Mon expérience d’écrivain,” 
Simone de Beauvoir says that her essays and novels are said to project 
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different sorts of pictures of the author, and that the essayist-Beauvoir 
has been said to be more poignant. Nonetheless, Beauvoir thinks that 
the Beauvoir derived from her essays and the Beauvoir derived from 
her novels are not different Beauvoirs. Rather, she says that for her, es-
says and novels are devices for different sorts of philosophical activities. 
Furthermore, Beauvoir says that she writes essays when she wants to put 
forward worked-out theses, whereas she uses novels for expressing ideas 
that might not be completely structured yet.35
6. Conclusions
In this paper, I have argued that literary fictions convey truth-claims and 
that these truth-claims cannot be ontologically ascribed to the implied 
author, who is a fictional entity. Instead, I have argued that the truth-
claims are to be attributed to the actual author of the work. I have argued 
that there is a suitable theory for interpreting the actual author’s com-
municative act made through a fiction: moderate actual intentionalism 
which argues that the author’s intentions manifest themselves in the work. 
Further, I have suggested that because moderate actual intentionalism 
looks for the author’s actual intentions and takes them into account in 
interpretation, this theory of interpretation is far more fitting than hypo-
thetical inten tionalism: moderate actual intentionalism aspires to reach 
the author’s actual intentions and uses them as criteria in unravelling the 
best interpre tation of her work. Finally, I have argued that in the conversa-
tional approach, a type of interpretation which aims at solving the truth-
claims made in a literary fiction, the implied author should be considered 
the author’s style or narrative device. I have suggested that in literary cul-
ture, authors are free to project any sort of (author constructions having 
any sort of) beliefs; that they are free to adopt literary personae in the act 
of writing. However, I have argued that the conversational approach is 
in such cases interested in the question of why the actual author has pro-
duced such kinds of works and adopted such a person.
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